The Philosophy of As-Is: The Ethics of Watsuji Tetsuro

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In prewar and wartime Japan, the orthodoxy of imperial subjecthood served to affirm existing political reality. Through the apotheosis of the imperial house as the highest locus of value and the definition of the nation as a seamless community, tennosei ideology effectively denied the legitimacy of critique and contestation — in short, politics — in the public sphere. By definition, loyal imperial subjects cannot dispute the will of the august sovereign. Since all state policies were also, by definition, expressions of imperial will, resistance to the state was drained of all legitimacy. In Japan, in the words of Andrew Barshay, “a powerful optimism flowed from what Maruyama called a ‘continuative mode of thought’ in which value and reality, norm and nature, were seen in terms of mutual confirmation.” Japan’s defeat in World War II, however, broke the hold of imperial mythology on public discourse. Naturally, the value orientation of prewar ideology immediately became a target of public criticism.

To Maruyama Masao, the preeminent spokesman of postwar modernist thought, it was precisely the lack of value autonomy in Japanese ultra-nationalism that accounted for its particularly egregious character, which led Japan down the path to nearly total disaster. What accords Japanese nationalism its “ultra” or “extreme” character, according to Maruyama, is the “exteriorization of morality” that resulted from the state’s monopoly over the right to determine values and the identification of ethical value with state power. In Europe, “questions of thought, belief and morality were deemed to be subjective matters and, as such, were guaranteed their subjective internal quality; meanwhile, state power was steadily absorbed into an ‘external’ legal system, which was of a technical nature.” In this case, political power and sovereignty is strictly formal, while the issue of values is left to individual conscience. In contrast, “Japanese morality never underwent the process of internalization that we have seen in the West, and accordingly it always had the impulse to transform itself into power. Morality is not summoned from the depths of the individual; on the contrary, it has its roots outside the individual and does not hesitate to assert itself in the form of energetic outward movement.” The identification of power and morality amounted to the conflation of \textit{sein} and \textit{sollen}, of what \textit{is} with what \textit{ought} to be; the nation is equated with value, not subject to any moral code that supercedes itself.

Furthermore, even though morality is identified with power, the power-holders themselves are not responsible moral subjects. Since the highest locus of value is the throne, the assessment of worth for a given social position is determined according to its proximity to it. Power holders themselves, who owed their positions to their proximity to the emperor, acted not according to their subjective values but to an exteriorized norm. Because even the emperor himself owes his position not to his subjective selfish but to a line of imperial ancestors “coeval with heaven and earth,” there was not a single moral subject in the entire edifice of Japanese nationalism. The result was power without responsibility, accounting for the aggression and brutality that was the hallmark of Japanese militarism.

Though rich in insight, Maruyama’s critique of Japanese nationalism must be situated in its postwar context, for its polemical intensity was necessitated by the urgent need to rethink the course of Japan’s modern history. Maruyama’s critique aimed to describe not an overt doctrine — “ultranationalism in Japan has no solid conceptual structure” — but a pervasive psychological condition shared by leaders and masses alike. Yoshimoto Taka’aki has taken Maruyama to task for his alleged status bias and “poverty of life history,” charging that Maruyama’s analysis stemmed from the elite intellectual’s distance from the masses. Indeed, “Maruyama’s analysis of fascism excludes any consideration of social and political role played by the mobilized intelligentsia in late imperial Japan.”

Nevertheless, Maruyama’s insight into the relation of values and politics brings up important questions that one can raise with regard to explicit ideas and doctrines. Was Japanese academic philosophy in the first half of this century to some degree also characterized by the externalization of values that Maruyama spoke of? Did Japanese philosophy offer theoretical vantage points from which the state could be transcended or resisted?

Of course, one can not speak of “Japanese philosophy” in such general terms. As a starting point of inquiry, this paper examines the ethical philosophy of Watsuji Tetsuro, whose \textit{Rinrigaku} has been hailed as “the definitive study
of Japanese ethics,” “a study of Japanese ethical thought and practice that is still unequaled.” The bulk of Watsuji’s ethical thought was composed during the Fifteen Year’s War: *Ethics as the Study of Man (Ningen no gaku to shite no rinrigaku)* appeared in 1934, and his *magnum opus, Rinrigaku,* was published in three volumes in 1937, 1942, and 1949. *Fudo,* which dates back in manuscript form to 1929, was published in 1935. Watsuji supported the war, even if he might have been critical of the way it was handled by the army. Crucial here is the historical context of Watsuji’s ethical system. Was there anything in Watsuji’s ethical philosophy that would have sanctioned resistance against a state that was committing aggression and murder in the name of emperor and nation? To answer this question, the early part of Watsuji’s career will be discussed, followed by an exposition of his ethical philosophy.

**INDIVIDUAL AND COMMUNITY**

Watsuji was born in 1889 and educated at Japan’s premier educational institutions, First Higher School and Tokyo Imperial University. Like many other members of his generation, the question of individualism dominated his youthful intellectual life. As Robert Bellah described,

> Cut off culturally from most of his countrymen by a through-going exposure to Western culture, and cut off from his family and hometown background by his life as a student in Tokyo, it is natural that Watsuji, like so many others in similar circumstances, should become concerned with the problems of individualism and self-realization.

Watsuji published his first two books on a pair of individualist philosophers, Nietzsche and Kierkegaard. In 1918, however, Watsuji published *The Resurrection of the Idols (Gazo Saiko),* which Bellah saw as an indication of intellectual reorientation (*tenko*) away from individualism and a “return to the warm *gemeinschaft* community of Japanese life.”

Apparently, the death of Natsume Soseki in 1916, whose lectures Watsuji had attended at First Higher School, helped to inspire the change of course. Indeed, Watsuji’s reminiscence of the novelist in *Gazo Saiko* testified to Soseki’s influence in the “Taisho-period transition from Western individualism and cosmopolitanism to inner cultivation and a repossessed Japanese cultural self-consciousness.” Late in his career, Soseki had turned away from his earlier individualism to embrace a position of *sokuten kyoshi* (follow heaven and abandon the self). His last novels, which seem to have made a great impression on Watsuji, grimly demonstrated the bankruptcy of individualism, for “love and sincerity can only live when *watakushi* and *shi* (egocentrism) are radically eliminated.” Watsuji, too, had become disappointed with Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, for individualism only “led him to an abyss of emptiness.” Indeed, “Watsuji’s reminiscence stresses the fact that Soseki loved *ningen,* that is truly human, but repudiated immorality, insincerity, and impurity with all his creative strength. He thus rejected egoism in all its modern bourgeois forms.” Therefore, by 1918 Watsuji had disavowed the individual as a legitimate basis of ethical action. Given the high esteem generally accorded to ideas of *kyodotai* (*community*) in public discourses of the period, it is not surprising that Watsuji turned toward the community as the true subject of benevolence, compassion, and morality.

Watsuji’s privileging of the community over the individual persisted throughout the remainder of his mature career. He believed that community assumed a culturally specific form in each nation and in the 1920’s composed a number of appreciations of ancient Japanese and Asian culture. Meanwhile, he continued to draw from developments in European philosophy, especially the growing phenomenological movement. Pioneered by Husserl as a non-empirical, intuitive method of knowledge, phenomenology made a great impact on Watsuji. In 1929, the intersection of communalism, cultural particularism, and European philosophy produced *Fudo,* one of Watsuji’s most influential works. This classic study of climate and culture is a useful starting point for our inquiry into Watsuji’s ethical philosophy.

*Fudo* was written in direct and critical response to Heidegger’s *Being and Time.* Sojourning in Berlin in 1927, Watsuji was among the first readers of Heidegger’s epoch-making treatise. To Watsuji, Heidegger’s *Dasein* analysis was tainted by its characteristically Western obsession with individuality and temporality, but its method of hermeneutic phenomenology can be used to re-situate *Dasein* in the concrete spatio-historicality of cultural existence. Through the study of climate, Watsuji would restore space and community to the phenomenological study of man.

By the term “climate,” Watsuji referred not to an objective natural environment, but to climate as the self-expression of man’s subjective existence. Central to Watsuji’s analysis is the phenomenological concept of intentionality, which maintains that “no one is ever aware of anything that is not in consciousness, and therefore, all objectivity is objectivity for some consciousness.” In the opening, theoretical chapter of *Fudo,* Watsuji illustrates this point with the example of the sensation of coldness. When one feels cold, it is not that coldness presses against one from the outside, but rather that one discovers oneself in the cold. The instance that the cold is discovered, we are already outside in the cold. Therefore, the basic essence of what is ‘present outside’ is not a thing or object as cold, but we
ourselves. ‘Ex-sistere’ is the fundamental principle of the structure our selves, and it is on this principle that intentionality depends. That we feel the cold is an intentional experience, in which we discover our selves in the state of ‘ex-sistere’, or our selves already outside in the cold.14 Moreover, intentional experience is not individual, but always mediated by others:

The structure of which “ex-sistere” is the fundamental principle is this “we,” not the mere “I.” Accordingly, “ex-sistere” is “to be out among other ‘I’s” rather than “to be out in a thing such as the cold.” This is not an intentional relation but a “mutual relationship” of existence. Thus it is primarily “we” in this “mutual relationship” that we discover ourselves in the cold.”15

Climate, then, is that in which man subjectively comprehends himself via mediation by others, in a form of Being-in-the-World that does not neglect man’s relation to specific climactic-cultural spaces and communities.

As shown in Fudo, Watsuji’s earlier embrace of the cultural community as the basis of love and sincerity was by now fully integrated into a sophisticated philosophical system. Watsuji was critical of Heidegger’s neglect of the spatial dimension of human existence, but he employed a similar mode of phenomenological inquiry to expound his concern with community and culture. With the concept of fudo, Watsuji was able to “uncover” the fundamentally social and intersubjective nature of human existence, and the resulting definition of man as inextricably both individual and social would become the pillar of his ethical thought. Bellah has interpreted Watsuji’s work as symptomatic of a larger pattern of Japanese particularism; Dilworth, in contrast, cites Watsuji’s grounding in German philosophy to argue that the ethician’s views were philosophical rather than ideological. But, however one defines and distinguishes philosophy and ideology, Watsuji’s case indicates that academic philosophy is not free from political concerns. In fact, Watsuji seems to have reproduced a tendency, already prevalent in Japanese discourse of the time, to conflate sein and sollen and thereby accord ultimate value to the social totality rather than to a specific group of ideas.

ETHICS

To Watsuji, the problem of ethics is not the problem of individual consciousness, but of human relations and reciprocities in the context of practical everyday activities. Therefore, any ethical inquiry can succeed only by subjectively grasping the historical realities of human existence through an understanding of its expressions. In short, what is required to answer the above question is a hermeneutic, or interpretive, method.16 Irrational historical reality can not be grasped by logic; rather, a hermeneutic that aims at the understanding historical reality through the interpretation of human expressions constitutes the proper path of ethical inquiry. In Heideggerian phenomenology, truth is the unconcealedness of Being that is disclosed through logos, or language. So it was with Watsuji, who opened Rinrigaku with an etymological analysis of four key terms in which the truth of human existence would reveal itself.

The first term is, not surprisingly, rinri (ethics), which consists of two characters: rin and ri. Rin means nakama, which “signifies a body or a system of relations, which a definite group of persons have with respect to each other, and at the same time signifies individual persons as determined by this system.”17 Ri, on the other hand, means reason or order. Rinri, therefore, “consists of the laws of social existence.”

But if rinri denotes the pattern of human interaction, “human” must first be defined. Watsuji differentiates the Japane- nese “ningen” from the Western “man” or “Mensch”; while ningen can be used like its Western counterparts to denote the individual, it originally signified the betweeness of human beings, or the public. Hence, “we Japanese have produced a distinctive conception of human being. According to it, ningen is the public and, at the same time, the individual human beings living in it.”18 Ningen, denoting both individual and society, is in itself a “unity of contradictions.”

“Public” (seken or yononaka) also has a specific and original meaning for Watsuji. The character yo is equivalent to “generation,” thereby giving the term “public” a historical dimension. Ken (or aida), which is also the second character of ningen, implies “living and dynamic betweeness, as a subjective interconnection of acts.”19 In sum, seen den- signates “community as subject,” which involves “the his- torical, climatic, and social structure of human existence.” As a result the community, conceived as the public, is identi- fied with the nation.20

Finally, sonzai (existence) is introduced. Again Watsuji contrasts the Japanese term against its European counterparts. Unlike “is” or sein, sonzai cannot be used as a copula. The character son designates preservation, or maintenance against loss over time, while zai originally designated the subject’s staying-in-place against departure. Since the sub- ject always stays in a place in the context of human relations, on a deeper level zai “means that she who acts subjectively, while coming and going in human relations in one way or another, nevertheless, remains within these relationships.”21 Taken together, sonzai is “the self-sustenance of the self as betweeness,” or “the interconnection of the acts of ningen.”

Ethics, then, is the manner of being for ningen as its activ- ities unfold in the practical interconnections of everyday being. For Watsuji, ethics is inextricably a manner of social being, and he goes to great lengths to critique the illu-
sion of individual consciousness so prevalent in Western philosophy. Even theorists of cogito necessarily think through language; and language, of course, is communally shared. The very use of language reflects the essential communality of ningen sonzai. “In combination with language, common sense, and those scientific theories prevalent in an age, all play a role, providing a number of prism facets that affect the contents of individual consciousness.”22 The notion of individual consciousness is no more than an abstraction in the face of the practical everydayness of ningen’s activities.

Hence, Watsuji’s hermeneutic does not assume a vantage point outside of the historical and practical reality of ningen sonzai. The individual does not suffice as a category of analysis because of its one-sidedness with respect to ningen’s intersubjective reality. The science of ethics, as the investigation of ningen sonzai itself, must be distinguished from and claims basic status over the study of being, on the one hand, and the study of moral ought (sollen), on the other. “Through the basic clarification of ningen’s sonzai, the problem of how objective things arise or of how consciousness of the ought to be arises in each age can be resolved.”23 Sollen is to be sought from within the historical horizon of ningen’s practical, subjective, and dynamic existence. In short, the justification of the ought is to be found in what historically is. Watsuji’s methodological premises thus already hint at the priority of what is over what ought to be.

Taking ningen’s condition of intersubjective betweenness as the point of departure, the laws of ethics are to be located in the double structure of human existence as both individual and totality. This structure is essentially a movement of negation that unfolds through the dialectic between individual and totality, the movement of absolute negativity returning to itself in the form of the nonduality of self and other. In Watsuji’s words,

There are three moments that are dynamically unified as the movement of negation: fundamental emptiness, then individual existence, and social existence as its negative development. These three are interactive with one another in practical reality and cannot be separated.24

Watsuji defines the individual as the negation of the community; the individual comes into being only by revolting against the totality. “Hence, individuality itself does not have an independent existence. Its essence is negation, that is emptiness.”25 Naoki Sakai argues that Watsuji’s negative definition of the individual results in the construction of the totality as both immanent in and anterior to individual consciousness.26 It follows that Watsuji’s dialectic was really no dialect at all, but the tyranny of the community over the individual. Sakai’s criticism is valid, as we will see later. But it is also important to explicate Watsuji’s own emphasis on the doubly negative quality of both the individual and totality. Totality, too, is established through negation, specifically the negation of the individual. In other words,

The ultimate feature of every kind of wholeness in human beings is “emptiness” and, hence, that the whole does not subsist in itself but appears only in the form of the restriction or the negation of the individual. To speak candidly, something whole that precedes individuals and prescribes them as such . . . does not really exist.27

The dual negation of both individual and the whole cannot in any way be temporally or spatially divided, and neither aspect is prior to another. The two terms of the dialectic “empties each other” in absolute negativity; in the Buddhist terms of William LaFleur, priority is an “illusion,” and the true meaning of emptiness lies in “co-dependent origination.”28 Totality perishes without self-aware individuals who can be negated, and individuals cannot subsist independently of a totality also to be negated. How, then, does one distinguish between the ethically good and the bad?

Although the dialectic between individual and totality constitute one single inseparable movement, some moments of the totality are privileged over the others. It was an unequal dialectic in which value is disproportionately distributed among different moments. For Watsuji, authenticity is identified solely with the moment of totality in the dialectic. Morality consists of a return to authenticity; the self arises by negating the whole in inauthentic revolt, but authenticity is again realized with the abandonment of the self, culminating in the nonduality of self and other. Watsuji wrote in direct opposition to Heidegger’s idea of authenticity, which he believed to be negligent of the moral dimension of intersubjective existence. Heidegger had defined authenticity as Dasein’s preparedness towards death, and identified inauthenticity with the loss of the self to the public (das Man). To Watsuji, Heidegger’s “up-side down version of authenticity,” hindered the development of the proper understanding of death.

The original countenance that makes its appearance in Heidegger’s “preparedness for death” is concerned through and through with “an individual” but not with ningen. Only in the relationship between self and other [does] the “preparedness for death” give full play to its genuine significance. As a spontaneous abandonment of the self, it paves the way for the nondual relation between the self and other and terminates in the activity of benevolence.29

In short, in Watsuji’s dialectic, moral goodness lies with the negation of the individual in selfless return to wholeness. As Robert Carter puts it, “the ethics of benevolence
is the development of the capacity to embrace others as oneself... (it is) a matter of compassion, spontaneous caring, concern for the whole.”

Watsuji’s ethics are above all concerned with the embrace of the whole by the individual, and the individual in itself is not endowed with any intrinsic ethical value. The negation of the whole, through which the individual is born, “is goodness when it is pierced by the movement of coming back (to authenticity) but is badness in and by itself.”

Morally worthless in and of itself, the individual functions as a formal category whose value is derived solely from its own negation. In this sense, value is externalized; the locus of value lies outside of the individual, who must relinquish the self to embrace what is outside of oneself. Watsuji’s individual, then, clearly lacks the value autonomy that Maruyama so cherishes. Morality compels the individual to embrace the whole, yet the latter is not bound by a similar ethical imperative.

This can be illustrated further through Watsuji’s analysis of trust and truth. Thus far, Watsuji’s analysis has been highly abstract. In terms of practical and concrete everyday activities, however, “the structure of existence (sonzai) appropriate to human beings (ningen) expects and depends on trust and truth in human relationships.”

Watsuji argues that trust is not a pre-condition of human relationships. Rather, it is the law of human existence that “renders trust capable of existing.” “Human relationships are those of trust; and at a place where human relationships prevail, trust is also established.” For instance, the fact that one may ask strangers for directions indicates the inherent existence of trust in the mutuality of ningen. In a state where trust does not exist, such human interaction is impossible; as long as ningen exists, so does trust.

Watsuji defines truth (makoto), on the other hand, as the reality of ningen sonzai, whose double structure entails a dialectical negative movement that returns to authentic homeground in unity. Watsuji here refers not to truth as the correspondence of word and deed, but to the truthfulness of human relations that are grounded in trust. “Truthfulness is decided in and through the human relation that consists in a relationship of trust. To speak truth expresses this relationship.”

Since truthfulness refers to the reality of human trust, truthfulness necessarily occurs as human relationships unfold in the returning movement of ningen sonzai to its authentic countenance. “Insofar as ningen sonzai is ningen sonzai, this movement cannot come to a halt. In other words, there is no state of affairs in which truthfulness does not occur.”

Falsehood and betrayal of trust, then, constitute halting moments in the dialectic in which the inauthentic opposition between self and other results in the negation of unity and the betrayal of trust. However, given that falsehood does not have its own subsistence, the halting moments in the dialectic are necessary overcame in the return movement toward authenticity. Betrayal and falsehood, by halting ningen sonzai’s movement toward authenticity, constitute badness, but they are good insofar as the movement continues and they are negated. Once again, the dispersion of ningen sonzai into individuals and the corresponding oppositions between self and other seem to be no more than formal categories devoid of ethical value. Of course, the individual is absolutely essential to Watsuji’s system; if individuals were completely submerged in the totality like cells in an organism, society and culture would lose their disciplinary function and henceforth perish. Moreover, trust and truth would be meaningless without the possibility of falsehood and betrayal. But, just as the above examples show, the individual is devoid of any intrinsic ethical value, and it functions only as a negative category that is necessary for the realization of the social whole. Since Watsuji’s idea of morality demands self-sacrifice, selves must exist, even if only to be sacrificed. Thus value is externalized beyond the individual and concentrated in the social whole, a whole without its own ethical imperative to follow.

The emptiness of the individual in Watsuji’s system also denies the possibility of actually negating and therefore transcending the whole. Even though truthfulness and trust are already inherent in ningen sonzai, given the possibility of falsehood and betrayal in the halting moments of the dialectic, the reality of ningen sonzai is also transformed into an ethical ought. “Because a human being’s truthfulness has the possibility of not taking place while always and already taking place, it turns out to be something that should take place.” Given the structure of ningen sonzai, human beings are necessarily and inextricably implicated in mutual and reciprocal relationships of trust, the betrayal of which constitutes a moral wrong.

However, human social totalities differ greatly, from nomadic tribes to modern nation-states. According to Watsuji’s prescription, the existing trust relationships of a given social totality also constitute a moral ought to be followed. Therefore, one is denied the possibility of morally transcending one’s particular social totality, if moral good is identified with trust in the totality regardless of its actions. As Gino Piovesana points out, Watsuji’s social relationism “lacked a scheme of values which could transcend the social aspects of society.”

Watsuji even “seems to justify the primitive custom of giving the wife to the guest as being a sign of communitarian spirit.” Sein is conflated with sollen, and one is left without a vantage point with which to challenge the existing reality of the community.

In hindsight, given the historical context of war in the 1930’s and 1940’s, Watsuji’s was an ethical philosophy that unfortunately failed to provide a conceptual vocabulary with which one could resist a state that breached morality in the name of emperor and nation. In Japanese discourses of the
time, the externalization of value and its identification with the nation, rather than with a set of abstract ideas, probably contributed to the silencing of resistance to the state.39

“The humane and gracious figure of Watsuji Tetsuro would not be problematic for modern Japan were it not for the fact that partly behind the cloak of just such thinking as his, a profoundly pathological social movement brought Japan to total near disaster,” wrote Robert Bellah.40

In Naoki Sakai’s dramatic terms, Watsuji’s ethics sanctioned a “blind leap into the destiny of the community,” through which his ethics of nakayoshi (being on good terms with others) was transformed into one of ichioku gyokusai (the total suicide of 100 million).41

In the end, Watsuji seems to have been oblivious to the possibility that the community could also betray the individual, which was the case for many in the context of total war.

All in all, the ethical choice that Watsuji offered was one of choosing what already exists as the social totality. The question is whether that is really a choice at all.

1 One form of resistance constituted what can be called an “imperial public,” in which criticism of the state was justified as faith to the true will of the emperor. However, such appeals to imperial will are highly co-optable, for the state controlled ultimate access to the emperor. See Andrew Barshay, State and Intellectual in Imperial Japan, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 9.


9 Bellah, “Japan’s Cultural Identity,” 587. William LaFleur argues that Watsuji’s change of course was not a “simple switch from universalized concerns to chauvinistic particularism.” Rather, it was an attempt to move beyond Euro-universalism and narrow particularism by turning to a third option of Asian cosmopolitanism, through an appreciation of Japan’s Buddhist heritage. However, as LaFleur notes, such a move also was highly susceptible to co-optation by the ideology of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. In any event, it was an reorientation toward communalism and culturalism. See William LaFleur, “A Turning in Taisho: Asia and Europe in the Early Writings of Watsuji Tetsuro,” in Culture and Identity ed. Thomas Rimer, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 234-257.


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16 Watsuji, Watsuji Tetsuro’s Rinrigaku, 29-45.

17 Watsuji, Watsuji Tetsuro’s Rinrigaku, 10-11.

18 Watsuji, Watsuji Tetsuro’s Rinrigaku, 15.

19 Watsuji, Watsuji Tetsuro’s Rinrigaku, 18-19.

20 Watsuji, Watsuji Tetsuro’s Rinrigaku, 148.


22 Watsuji, Watsuji Tetsuro’s Rinrigaku, 74.

23 Watsuji, Watsuji Tetsuro’s Rinrigaku, 22.

24 Watsuji, Watsuji Tetsuro’s Rinrigaku, 117.

25 Watsuji, Watsuji Tetsuro’s Rinrigaku, 80.


27 Watsuji, Watsuji Tetsuro’s Rinrigaku, 99.


29 Watsuji, Watsuji Tetsuro’s Rinrigaku, 226.


31 Watsuji, Watsuji Tetsuro’s Rinrigaku, 284.

32 Watsuji, Watsuji Tetsuro’s Rinrigaku, 343.

33 Watsuji, Watsuji Tetsuro’s Rinrigaku, 271.

34 Watsuji, Watsuji Tetsuro’s Rinrigaku, 275.

35 Watsuji, Watsuji Tetsuro’s Rinrigaku, 281.

36 Watsuji, Watsuji Tetsuro’s Rinrigaku, 282.

37 Watsuji, Watsuji Tetsuro’s Rinrigaku, 280.


39 Unfortunately, Volume II of Rinrigaku, which contains Watsuji’s ideas on the state, has not been translated. This paper is based mostly on the translation of Volume I.


41 Sakai, “Return to the West/Return to the East,” 268-270.